Judgment: 2014-09-09 · Court archive

High Court refuses leave to challenge DPP’s decision not to prosecute in extradition case

The court held that the applicant had not shown exceptional circumstances to review the DPP’s decision or refusal to give reasons. The extradition request remained for consideration in separate proceedings.

High Court · [2014] IEHC 443

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Eric Eoin Marques (Applicant)
  • The Director of Public Prosecutions
  • Ireland
What

The court held that the applicant had not shown exceptional circumstances to review the DPP’s decision or refusal to give reasons. The extradition request remained for consideration in separate proceedings.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Dublin
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The court considered whether there was an arguable basis to review either decision. It said prosecutorial decisions could be reviewable in exceptional circumstances, but the applicant had not alleged bad faith, improper motive or improper policy. The circumstances he relied on—including his offer to plead guilty, his family’s ties to Ireland and the possibility of extradition—did not show that the DPP’s decision-making process was deficient or that the decision directly prejudiced an identified constitutional or fundamental right.

The High Court refused Eric Eoin Marques leave to bring judicial review challenges to the Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision not to prosecute him in Ireland and her refusal to give reasons for that decision. It dismissed his proceedings. The ruling did not determine whether Marques would be extradited to the United States; the extradition request remained subject to separate proceedings in which he could raise objections.

The DPP’s decision followed a request from Marques’s solicitor, who said he was prepared to plead guilty to Irish offences corresponding to the conduct underlying the US extradition request. The solicitor argued that the alleged conduct was largely organised from Dublin, that evidence could be used in an Irish prosecution and that extradition could expose Marques to a disproportionate sentence. The DPP replied that she had carefully considered the representations, consulted investigating gardaí and counsel, and taken account of the prosecutors’ guidelines. She said it was not her practice to give reasons for a decision not to prosecute.

The court considered whether there was an arguable basis to review either decision. It said prosecutorial decisions could be reviewable in exceptional circumstances, but the applicant had not alleged bad faith, improper motive or improper policy. The circumstances he relied on—including his offer to plead guilty, his family’s ties to Ireland and the possibility of extradition—did not show that the DPP’s decision-making process was deficient or that the decision directly prejudiced an identified constitutional or fundamental right.

The judge noted that the DPP’s letter said she had carefully considered the solicitor’s representations. The court considered it reasonable to infer that the extradition circumstances had been taken into account. It also rejected the claim that an Irish prosecution would have presented no evidential difficulty: an offer to plead guilty was not itself admissible evidence, and some potentially important evidence and witnesses were abroad. The court said it could not determine what factors actually informed the DPP’s decision.

The court also refused leave to challenge the refusal to provide reasons. It distinguished a Supreme Court case involving a decision that affected a person’s constitutional right to trial by jury. Marques had no right to be prosecuted in Ireland or to have extradition barred, and the extradition request’s consideration did not mean he would necessarily be surrendered. The court concluded that, without exceptional circumstances making the decision reviewable, there was no arguable case that reasons had to be provided.

The judgment left constitutional and European Convention challenges to the amended extradition law for later consideration if necessary. Its operative conclusion was to refuse leave for both judicial review challenges and dismiss the proceedings.

Read the original court judgment

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