Judgment: 2010-03-09 · Court archive

High Court dismisses challenge to wild bird hunting licence over lack of standing

The court dismissed all aspects of a judicial review challenge to a 2007 licence for dog training and field trials, finding the applicants lacked sufficient standing. It did not quash the expired licence or decide the remaining procedural issues.

The High Court · [2010] IEHC 61

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • The Irish Kennel Club
  • John Edwards (Judge)
What

The court dismissed all aspects of a judicial review challenge to a 2007 licence for dog training and field trials, finding the applicants lacked sufficient standing. It did not quash the expired licence or decide the remaining procedural issues.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The applicants argued that the licence authorised hunting during vulnerable periods and that Irish law did not properly implement the Directive’s protections. The respondents denied that the legal framework or the licence breached EU law. Scientific affidavits conflicted over the degree of disturbance caused by dog trialling and the timing of breeding and rearing periods. Because neither side cross-examined the experts, the judge said the court could not resolve those conflicts; he found the applicants had not discharged their burden of proof on that issue.

The High Court dismissed a judicial review challenge to a 2007 licence allowing the Irish Kennel Club to authorise listed members to hunt protected wild birds, excluding killing, for gundog training and field trials. The court’s decision turned on the applicants’ lack of locus standi, or sufficient interest to bring the case.

The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice John Edwards on 9 March 2010, concerned a licence issued by the Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government on 8 March 2007. It covered specified bird species during the period from 1 February to 31 March 2007. The licence had expired, and the applicants did not seek to quash it as an extant licence.

The three applicants brought the proceedings primarily on behalf of the National Association of Regional Game Councils, an unincorporated body. They challenged the Minister’s authority to issue the licence in its particular form and argued that permitting dog trialling during birds’ reproductive periods breached the EU Birds Directive. They sought declarations, injunctions and damages, among other relief.

The applicants argued that the licence authorised hunting during vulnerable periods and that Irish law did not properly implement the Directive’s protections. The respondents denied that the legal framework or the licence breached EU law. Scientific affidavits conflicted over the degree of disturbance caused by dog trialling and the timing of breeding and rearing periods. Because neither side cross-examined the experts, the judge said the court could not resolve those conflicts; he found the applicants had not discharged their burden of proof on that issue.

On standing, the judge found the applicants had shown no personal interest separate from their association membership, and no evidence that they held relevant sporting or hunting rights on trust. He also found no special circumstances requiring the court to hear the challenge despite that lack of individual interest. The judgment records the court’s view that there was a strong circumstantial basis to believe the case was connected to a dispute between the association and the Kennel Club.

The judge said the Wildlife Acts adequately transposed the relevant provisions of the Birds Directive. He also concluded that dog trialling fell within the Irish statutory definition of hunting, but did not decide that the licensed activity breached EU law. The court was not satisfied that the applicants had established standing on the European-law aspects of the case either.

The court dismissed all aspects of the claim for lack of locus standi. It did not decide whether the challenge was moot or whether relief should be refused for lack of candour. The judgment therefore did not grant the applicants’ requested declarations, injunctions or damages.

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