The Supreme Court has allowed an appeal concerning Anselm Joseph Walshe while dismissing the separate appeal arising from the case of Kay Bedford, in proceedings involving the use of Garda arrest powers under section 30 of the Offences against the State Act 1939.
Chief Justice John L. Murray agreed with Mr Justice Geoghegan and Mr Justice Kearns that the appeal in Mr Walshe’s case should succeed. He separately agreed with Mr Justice Kearns that the appeal concerning Ms Bedford should be dismissed.
The short judgment focused on the legal requirement for a Garda officer making an arrest under section 30 to hold the necessary suspicion personally.
Chief Justice Murray held that an instruction from a superior Garda officer to make an arrest can form part of the information available to the arresting officer, but cannot by itself be enough. There must be some additional element which gives the officer an understanding of the rationale or factual basis for the arrest.
The court said this did not impose an unduly onerous requirement. By way of example, an arresting Garda could have the necessary reasonable suspicion where a superior officer informed them that reliable intelligence indicated that the person might be involved in an offence covered by section 30.
The Chief Justice said that such an additional element was present in Mr Walshe’s case, referring to the more detailed reasoning given in the judgments of his colleagues.
The ruling therefore confirms that hierarchical instructions within An Garda Síochána do not, without more, satisfy the statutory requirement that the arresting member have reasonable suspicion. The officer need not necessarily possess every underlying detail, but must have some substantive basis beyond a simple direction to arrest.
The supplied judgment does not set out the factual background to either plaintiff’s arrest or the precise High Court orders under appeal.