The Court of Appeal has dismissed Joseph Lavery’s appeal against a High Court decision refusing to set aside an order that struck out his proceedings. It also restrained him from issuing further motions in this appeal without prior leave from a nominated Court of Appeal judge.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Allen on 17 June 2024 with the agreement of Ms Justice Whelan and Ms Justice Faherty, affirmed the High Court order. It did not impose the broader filing restriction sought by the respondents.
Lavery’s 2022 action claimed that he was immune from court summonses and orders and sought €2 million in damages. The High Court struck out the proceedings in June 2023, finding the claim frivolous and vexatious and bound to fail. That decision also relied on a 2016 Isaac Wunder order requiring Lavery to obtain a High Court judge’s leave before instituting proceedings. Lavery did not appeal the June 2023 order within the time allowed.
He later applied to the High Court to set that order aside, arguing that other proceedings supported his claim to immunity. The High Court dismissed the application as unstateable and awarded costs. Lavery appealed that dismissal.
The Court of Appeal said the set-aside application was based on the assertion that the earlier decision was wrong, and that Lavery had not established grounds for reopening a final order. The proper route to challenge the June 2023 decision had been an appeal, which he did not bring. The court therefore dismissed his appeal and affirmed the High Court’s order.
The Public Law respondents had asked the appeal court to extend the filing restriction so Lavery would need leave to lodge any document in either the High Court or Court of Appeal. The court declined to extend it for High Court applications, noting that the set-aside motion had been issued with leave and the appeal itself did not require leave.
However, after the respondents filed their request, Lavery issued three motions in the Court of Appeal unrelated to his appeal. The judgment said they were calculated to disrupt Circuit Court proceedings in Cavan, and recorded that Lavery accepted he was attempting to disrupt that business. The court found this pattern gave rise to an apprehension of further abuse of process.
The resulting restriction is confined to this appeal: Lavery must obtain prior leave, sought in writing from the Registrar, before issuing any further motion in it. The respondents were awarded their appeal costs, subject to Lavery’s right to file a written submission on costs within ten days of electronic delivery of the judgment.