The High Court has refused Tearfund Ireland Ltd’s application for a protective costs declaration in a dispute over whether the advancement of religion is a charitable purpose under the Valuation Act 2001.
Tearfund sought a declaration that it would not be liable for the Commissioner of Valuation’s costs if its position did not prevail in the case-stated appeal. The appeal concerns the Valuation Tribunal’s decision that the statutory meaning of charitable purposes includes the advancement of religion. The High Court judgment addressed only the costs-protection application, not that underlying legal question.
Tearfund had sought an exemption from rates for its Dublin office. The judgment records that there was no dispute the offices were used for Tearfund’s purposes and otherwise than for private profit. Its appeal against the refusal of an exemption was dismissed because promotion of religion was not deemed a charitable purpose under the 2001 Act. The annual rates bill was then about €4,000.
The Commissioner sought the case stated after the Valuation Tribunal ruled in a separate matter, Veritas Company DAC v Commissioner of Valuation, that advancement of religion was a charitable purpose under the Act. The Tearfund and Veritas cases were linked. In Veritas, the parties had agreed not to seek costs from one another if their positions failed in the High Court or any appeal. The Commissioner offered Tearfund a similar mutual arrangement, but Tearfund declined it.
The court considered criteria agreed by counsel for a protective costs order, including whether the issue was of general public importance, whether the applicant had a private interest and whether it would probably discontinue the proceedings without protection. The judge said the court should be slow to anticipate what the judge hearing the case stated would consider when deciding costs, and noted that judge’s statutory power to award costs.
The judge found Tearfund had not shown that the issue affected a sufficiently large group of charities to meet the public-importance and public-interest criteria. He also found that Tearfund had a financial interest in the outcome and had not met the no-private-interest criterion. Its confirmation that it would remain represented at the case-stated hearing meant the probability-of-discontinuance criterion was not met. The judge also said the reasons for rejecting the proposed mutual costs arrangement did not withstand reasonable scrutiny.
The principal declaration was refused. Other declarations were not actively pursued. The court directed Tearfund to submit short written submissions on the costs of this application within two weeks; the Commissioner was asked to reply if the issue could not be agreed. The judgment did not determine those application costs, which were to be agreed or decided before the order was perfected.