The Supreme Court dismissed Richard Anthony Carne’s appeal against a High Court refusal to release him from extradition proceedings, concluding that his medical condition did not amount to “other exceptional circumstances” under section 50(2)(bbb) of the Extradition Act 1965, as amended.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Geoghegan on 21 April 2005, left the High Court order in place. The Court did not decide whether the lapse of time in the case was exceptional, or consider other aspects of the appeal, because it concluded that the medical circumstances ground failed.
Carne faced allegations in England of a series of sexual offences against five girls under 13, said to have occurred between 1 January 1980 and 31 December 1997. The allegations were not findings of guilt. After failing to answer bail at Plymouth Crown Court in April 1999, a warrant was issued. English police later discovered he was living in Dublin. Nine warrants were issued in December 2000; an affidavit for the respondent explained that preparing charges in a case involving multiple alleged offences and complainants had taken time.
Carne argued that the passage of time was exceptional and that his health was an additional exceptional circumstance. In affidavits, he said he had suffered strokes while imprisoned in Dublin awaiting extradition and feared that trial or detention would worsen his health. Medical reports described extensive vascular disease, previous strokes, leg artery disease and narrowing of the aortic valve for which surgery was proposed. A doctor also said Carne might have difficulty instructing solicitors about alleged offences spanning a wide range of dates and considered extradition oppressive in light of his condition.
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court’s view that the medical evidence did not show that extradition would be unjust, oppressive or invidious. It also held that the evidence did not establish the separate requirement of “other exceptional circumstances”. Geoghegan J said more traumatic and devastating evidence of ill-health would be needed for a medical condition to meet that threshold. The appeal was dismissed on that basis alone.