The High Court refused an application by a Cameroon national for leave to seek judicial review of decisions refusing his refugee claim and making him liable to deportation.
In a judgment delivered on 18 April 2007, Mr Justice Charleton said the case depended essentially on the applicant’s credibility before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. The court had carefully scrutinised the papers, pending a definitive ruling on whether the applicable review standard was reasonableness or “anxious scrutiny”. It did not decide that broader question.
The applicant, identified in the redacted judgment as T. G., said he had faced persecution in Cameroon because of his support for a movement seeking greater support for English-speaking people. He claimed he had been arrested and tortured after attending a demonstration and later after photocopying flyers. These were his claims, not findings by the court.
The tribunal had rejected his account. It relied in part on a Home Office fact-finding report concerning Cameroon, which said activists associated with the group had not been imprisoned for that reason alone between 1999 and 2001. The tribunal treated the report as undermining his account. It also found his allegation of torture not credible, referring to his demeanour and the manner in which he gave that evidence; no medical report about the claimed injuries to his feet had been provided.
The tribunal also disbelieved his account of passing through France, and possibly other countries, on a false passport without difficulty. The applicant had said France was a brief stopover and that he did not seek asylum there because he was continuing his journey.
Charleton J said a reviewing court should not substitute its own view of credibility for that of the tribunal member, who had the opportunity to observe the applicant giving evidence. The court could intervene where the process used to reach the credibility finding was legally flawed. He also noted that the standard of proof for a refugee claim was lower than the civil balance of probabilities, and that one lie would not automatically make every other assertion false.
The judge said the Minister’s deportation decision depended on the earlier decisions. He found no evidence that the Minister had failed to consider other rights relevant to the applicant alongside State immigration policy. The application for leave was refused. The judgment did not grant leave to bring judicial review or quash any of the decisions.