The High Court refused an extension of time for a family to challenge an International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) decision refusing their appeal. Because their challenge to deportation orders depended entirely on the IPAT challenge, the court dismissed that challenge too and discharged an injunction.
The applicants are identified in the judgment as a husband and wife and their two children. After their protection application was refused, an oral appeal hearing took place on 10 July 2018. They were notified on 8 October 2018 that the appeal had failed.
Their solicitor said the next day that they should apply for a review of the refusal of permission to remain under section 49(7) of the International Protection Act 2015, while counsel’s advice was being sought on a possible judicial review of the IPAT decision. No judicial review of that decision was brought at the time. The section 49(7) review applications were refused in February and March 2019.
The family later sought other legal advice. The judgment says they were advised by immigration consultants identified as THL Legal, who appeared on the evidence to have improperly prepared court documents despite not being solicitors. That led to a Garda complaint and other investigations. Deportation orders were made in March 2019. The family contacted their current solicitors on 10 May 2019, and filed grounds on 24 May challenging both the deportation orders and the earlier IPAT decision.
An extension of time had been granted at the leave stage without prejudice, but the respondents challenged it. The applicants relied on having been told that papers had gone to counsel and on not being advised to seek a second opinion. The judge held that this did not provide a good and sufficient explanation for the delay. He said the relevant period was the 28 days after notification of the IPAT decision, and found no demonstrated default by the lawyers at that time warranting an extension.
The court therefore refused the extension for the IPAT challenge. The judgment records that the applicants’ counsel accepted that the challenge to the deportation orders depended entirely on that challenge. The court dismissed it and discharged the injunction. The ruling concerned the delay and the dependent claims; it did not determine the underlying protection claim on its merits.