The Supreme Court has refused an application to stop the Personal Injuries Assessment Board’s appeal on the ground that it had become moot, ruling that the appeal should proceed in the normal manner.
The application was brought by Declan O’Brien, who sought directions on the appeal’s status and on his participation if it continued. The appeal concerns a High Court declaration that PIAB acted in breach of section 7 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003, or without authority under another provision, when it declined to act on an authority appointing O’Brien’s solicitor and instead corresponded directly with him, copying the solicitor.
O’Brien had instructed solicitors after suffering a workplace injury on 5 November 2001. In August 2004, his solicitor sent PIAB an application form, a €50 fee and O’Brien’s signed authority appointing the firm to act exclusively for him. PIAB would not treat the application as valid until it received a medical report. The solicitor supplied one on 22 October 2004, and the separate dispute about whether a report had to accompany the application was not pursued further.
The High Court ruled for O’Brien in January 2005 and later made the declaration and awarded him costs. PIAB appealed; O’Brien filed a cross-appeal. In January 2006, PIAB authorised him to bring court proceedings against his employer. The parties accepted that, after that authorisation and the start of those proceedings, he no longer had to deal with PIAB.
O’Brien argued that the dispute about PIAB’s communications with his solicitor was therefore hypothetical and that the appeal should not continue. He also submitted that PIAB could not use its costs appeal alone to revive an otherwise moot dispute. The Supreme Court rejected the application, holding that PIAB had a current interest in challenging a declaration affecting how it exercised statutory powers across other applications, as well as in disputing the substantial costs order.
The Court also said the declaration governed PIAB’s obligations to O’Brien in any future personal-injury claim, should one arise. It concluded that the appeal remained a live controversy and refused the application. It did not decide the substantive appeal or determine whether the Law Society of Ireland would have amicus curiae status at a substantive hearing. The judgment said such status on appeal would require an application on notice to the parties.