The High Court has ordered the quashing of an arrest warrant issued after a drink-driving case against Aaron Judge was struck out when the prosecuting Garda could not attend court.
Judge was arrested on 31 August 2003 and charged with an offence under section 49(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1961. He appeared in the District Court on 3 October, but the case was struck out because no Garda was present to deal with it.
The prosecuting Garda later received directions from the Director of Public Prosecutions to re-enter the matter. She applied for an arrest warrant, which was issued by District Judge James Scally on 5 February 2004. The judgment noted that the Garda’s affidavit gave a different date for her application, and said that account appeared to be incorrect because the warrant itself was dated 5 February.
The High Court examined the legal powers governing warrants in the Dublin Metropolitan District. It held that the judge’s discretion had to be exercised under sections 49 and 51 of the Dublin Police Act 1842. In particular, a warrant could not be justified where a summons would be equally effective, except perhaps for a charge of a very serious nature. The judge described the alleged offence as minor for the relevant constitutional purposes and not very serious in that sense.
The court found that the sworn information contained no good grounds for issuing the warrant, such as circumstances suggesting Judge intended to abscond. It concluded that District Judge Scally had misdirected himself in law, acted beyond his powers and failed to consider the essential question of whether sufficient grounds existed. The court also criticised what it understood to be a convenient practice for reinstating cases and arranging arrests so as to minimise inconvenience, finding that practice inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and the applicable law.
The High Court granted an order of certiorari directing that the 5 February 2004 order be delivered up to be quashed. It did not decide the applicant’s separate argument that a District Court rule permitting warrants in certain circumstances was beyond the rule-making power. The judgment addressed the warrant; it does not state that the underlying charge was dismissed or determine its merits.