The Supreme Court dismissed Aftab Ahmed’s appeal against the High Court’s refusal of judicial-review relief concerning a Medical Council fitness-to-practise inquiry. It held that his challenge over legal aid and representation should have been raised in earlier proceedings and was brought after gross, inordinate and inexcusable delay. The Court therefore affirmed the High Court order and did not decide the appeal’s other issues.
Ahmed had been acquitted in January 1999 of two criminal charges arising from alleged actions involving two patients at Dublin’s Mater Hospital in July 1997. The acquittal did not end the Medical Council’s separate consideration of allegations of professional misconduct. In October 1999, its Fitness to Practise Committee decided there was a prima facie case for an inquiry.
In earlier judicial-review proceedings, the High Court refused most of the relief sought but restrained an inquiry into two allegations that precisely mirrored the criminal charges. The remaining eight allegations proceeded to a disciplinary hearing in February 2002. Ahmed’s solicitors had asked the Council about legal or financial assistance, saying he was unable to afford representation. The Council replied that it could not provide legal aid, funding or representation.
The present case sought to stop the inquiry from reaching the reporting stage and to obtain declarations concerning the Council’s alleged failure to fund legal representation. Ahmed argued that fair procedures and constitutional rights required such assistance, or that the relevant provisions of the Medical Practitioners Act 1978 were invalid if they did not permit it.
The Supreme Court focused on why that issue had not been raised in the first judicial-review case. The judgment said Ahmed had legal advice and representation throughout, was impecunious at the relevant times, and had offered no tenable explanation for waiting until shortly before the refixed inquiry to raise legal aid. The Court concluded the issue could and should have been included in the earlier proceedings, and that bringing it later amounted to an abuse of process in the circumstances.
The Court also treated the delay as an independent reason to refuse relief. It noted the inquiry had already been stopped once on the eve of its start and again after three hearing days, causing distress and inconvenience to witnesses, including complainants who had given evidence twice. Because these grounds were sufficient to dismiss the appeal, the Court did not consider the other points raised. The judgment does not determine the professional-misconduct allegations.