Judgment: 2001-12-06 · Court archive

Supreme Court rules sleeping driver could still be ‘in charge’ of car with intent to drive

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Edward Byrne
  • Garda Sean Kinneen
  • Murray J
What

Supreme Court rules sleeping driver could still be ‘in charge’ of car with intent to drive

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Navan Road
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The Supreme Court has ruled that a motorist found asleep behind the wheel may still be regarded as being in charge of a vehicle and intending to drive for the purposes of drink-driving law.

The Supreme Court has ruled that a motorist found asleep behind the wheel may still be regarded as being in charge of a vehicle and intending to drive for the purposes of drink-driving law.

The ruling arose from Edward Byrne’s appeal to the Circuit Court against a District Court conviction for being in charge of a vehicle with intent to drive while over the legal alcohol limit.

Garda Sean Kinneen found Byrne asleep in the driver’s seat of a Peugeot 405 on the hard shoulder of the Navan Road at Ashtown, Dublin 15, at about 1.20am. The car’s lights were on and the keys were in the ignition, turned towards the ready position.

After Byrne was woken, Garda Kinneen observed signs of intoxication and arrested him. A urine sample later analysed by the Medical Bureau of Road Safety showed 228 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of urine.

The Circuit Court referred two legal questions to the Supreme Court. The first was whether Byrne could be found to have been in charge of the car with intent to drive. The second was whether the judge could consider Byrne’s intentions before he fell asleep.

Murray J, delivering judgment on December 6, 2001, answered both questions yes.

The court held that being “in charge” should be given its ordinary, common-sense meaning and was connected with possession or control. Byrne was alone in the driver’s seat, with the lights on and keys in the ignition, and there was no evidence that he had relinquished control of the car.

On intention, the court said falling asleep did not necessarily mean an earlier purpose to drive had ceased. Once the court is satisfied a person was in charge, the statutory presumption of an intention to drive arises unless the defendant raises a reasonable doubt to the contrary.

The ruling determined the legal questions in the case stated; the Circuit Court remained responsible for deciding Byrne’s appeal on the facts.

Read the original court judgment

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