The High Court has postponed a proposed Teaching Council notification to the National Vetting Bureau until the first directions hearing before the Court of Appeal, while a teacher seeks to appeal the dismissal of his case against the Council.
In a further judgment on 8 March 2019, Mr Justice Allen ordered the plaintiff to pay the Council’s costs, to be taxed and ascertained. He also continued an injunction on the plaintiff’s undertaking that he would not engage in activities requiring vetting disclosure pending the appeal. The injunction is limited to the first directions hearing; the court did not continue it through the hearing or outcome of the appeal.
The plaintiff had sought a permanent injunction preventing the Council from notifying the Bureau under section 19 of the National Vetting Bureau (Children and Vulnerable Persons) Act 2012. The action, begun in July 2018, was dismissed in a judgment delivered on 26 February 2019. The March hearing addressed costs and the separate application for an injunction pending appeal.
The judge said the plaintiff had not identified an arguable ground of appeal. He considered that an argument about delay might be formulated, but said success on that point would not resolve the central question of whether delay would remove the Council’s statutory obligation and power to notify a bona fide concern. He described the plaintiff’s “use it or lose it” argument as untenable. He also said he saw no conceivable basis for the misfeasance claim and no evidence supporting it.
The judge nevertheless weighed the practical consequences while giving the plaintiff a chance to ask the Court of Appeal to find that he was wrong. He said a notification could affect the plaintiff’s employment prospects and might be difficult to remove from the Bureau’s database if the appeal succeeded. The Council, meanwhile, maintained that it was obliged to report a bona fide concern and that the reporting requirement served the statutory scheme protecting children and vulnerable persons.
The judge concluded that the balance of convenience favoured postponing notification until the first directions hearing, provided the plaintiff gave the undertaking. The order does not determine the appeal or prevent a notification after that point. The source does not state whether the plaintiff later pursued the appeal or what happened at the directions hearing.