The Supreme Court has declined to intervene in the Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision to pursue an assault charge arising from an alleged incident in Letterkenny in 2001. The Court said delay alone did not justify prohibiting the trial, and left the trial judge with full jurisdiction to ensure it is fair.
John Carlin was charged on 14 July 2001 with assaulting Paul McGeady in Letterkenny on 30 June that year, causing him harm, contrary to section 3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. He was remanded on station bail to appear at Letterkenny District Court on 4 October 2001, but could not attend because he had been sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment at Belfast Crown Court.
After his release in February 2003, Carlin made inquiries about the Letterkenny proceedings. He was told by gardaí in November 2003 that the DPP had decided not to pursue the case and that there would be no prosecution. Carlin said he believed the matter was over.
The judgment records that the complainant’s family later met gardaí and raised concerns about the decision. Those concerns were conveyed to the DPP by letter dated 18 November 2003. A fresh direction to prosecute was issued on 8 May 2004. As Carlin was outside the State, a European arrest warrant was sought. He was arrested in Northern Ireland on 18 May 2006 under a warrant issued by the High Court in November 2005.
In the appeal, the appellant raised delay, stress and anxiety, and the issue of lost evidence. Denham J said lost evidence was not an issue in the case, with the prosecution intending to rely on the injured party’s primary evidence. She concluded that the appellant’s evidence of stress and anxiety did not ground an order in his favour. While accepting there had been delay, she said delay per se was not a reason to prohibit the trial.
Denham J also addressed the DPP’s independence and the requirement for fair procedures. She said it was appropriate for the DPP to have a process to review an earlier decision, but that prosecutorial processes must be fair and be seen to be fair. She noted that the circumstances differed from earlier cases cited in the judgment.
Concluding that there were no legal grounds for the Court to intervene in the DPP’s discretion, Denham J agreed with Fennelly J’s judgment and proposed order. The excerpt does not set out the terms of that order. It states that the trial judge retains full jurisdiction to ensure a fair trial, and that, if there is a conviction, the circumstances of the case and the appellant remain relevant to sentencing.