Judgment: 2014-01-29 · Court archive

Supreme Court dismisses appeal over timing of personal injury claim

The court held that a PIAB authorisation sent by registered post is issued when it would arrive in the ordinary course of post, leaving John Molloy’s claim within time.

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • John Molloy (Plaintiff)
  • Albert Reid (Defendant)
What

The court held that a PIAB authorisation sent by registered post is issued when it would arrive in the ordinary course of post, leaving John Molloy’s claim within time.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court had accepted Molloy’s interpretation and rejected Reid’s application to have the claim treated as statute barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the PIAB Act as a whole, including its provisions for delivering documents, leaving them at an address, or sending them by registered post. It held that treating a document as issued before the recipient had received it, or was deemed to have received it, would create different time limits depending on the method of delivery.

The Supreme Court dismissed Albert Reid’s appeal against a High Court ruling that John Molloy’s personal injury claim was not statute barred. The appeal concerned when a Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB) authorisation sent by registered post counts as “issued” for calculating the claim’s limitation period.

Molloy alleges he was significantly injured on 15 June 2002 when a horse struck him at Reid’s farm, and alleges Reid was negligent. The Supreme Court did not determine those allegations. It decided a preliminary limitation issue only.

At the time, the limitation period for personal injury claims was three years. Molloy’s completed PIAB application was received on 17 May 2005, when 29 days remained in that period. Reid did not consent to a PIAB assessment, and an authorisation allowing court proceedings was posted to Molloy on 22 September 2005. The proceedings were issued on 20 April 2006.

Under section 50 of the PIAB Act, time is excluded from the making of an application until six months after the authorisation’s issue. Reid argued that issue occurred when the authorisation was posted. On that calculation, the court proceedings began one day after the limitation period expired. Molloy argued that the date was when the authorisation was received, or deemed received, in the ordinary course of post. On that calculation, the claim was in time.

The High Court had accepted Molloy’s interpretation and rejected Reid’s application to have the claim treated as statute barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the PIAB Act as a whole, including its provisions for delivering documents, leaving them at an address, or sending them by registered post. It held that treating a document as issued before the recipient had received it, or was deemed to have received it, would create different time limits depending on the method of delivery.

The court concluded that, where an authorisation is sent by registered post, its issue date for section 50 purposes is the date it would have arrived in the ordinary course of post. It also held that the Interpretation Act 1937’s postal deeming provision applies to registered post. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the High Court’s conclusion that Molloy’s claim was not statute barred and dismissed Reid’s appeal. The judgment resolved the limitation question; it did not decide liability or the underlying injury claim.

Read the original court judgment

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