The High Court set aside, by consent, a Labour Court determination that a doctor employed by the Health Service Executive was entitled to a contract of indefinite duration under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term) Act 2003.
In a judgment delivered on 9 May 2014, Ms Justice Baker found that the Labour Court had been entitled to treat the doctor’s employment under a series of fixed-term contracts from 2003 as continuous. She also upheld its finding that the written Sligo contract was for a specific purpose: providing locum cover for a named consultant, Dr Victor Moore.
The doctor began working for the HSE in June 2003 and held a series of temporary and locum posts at several hospitals. From July 2007, he worked at Sligo General Hospital as a locum for Dr Moore. Moore retired on 1 June 2010. The doctor continued performing his duties and the HSE continued paying him until his employment was formally terminated on 16 August 2011, after another candidate was appointed to the permanent post.
The Labour Court had found that the locum contract ended when Moore retired and that a separate oral contract arose from the parties’ subsequent conduct. The High Court found no error of law in that conclusion. It ruled, however, that the new contract did not become a statutory contract of indefinite duration under section 9(3) of the 2003 Act. That provision applies when a fixed-term contract contravenes the Act’s limits on renewals; the Labour Court had not identified a renewal to which those limits applied.
Justice Baker also held that the Labour Court had erred in using an earlier email to interpret the clear written Sligo contract and in applying the contra proferentem rule to it. The email was an explanation of why the doctor had not been offered a permanent post, the judge found, rather than a contractual term. The error did not change the conclusion that the Sligo contract was a locum contract for Dr Moore’s absence.
The HSE’s appeal succeeded to some extent. The judge rejected its argument that the doctor lacked standing to bring proceedings under the Act, and said the Labour Court’s consideration of objective justification did not form the basis of its decision. After judgment, the parties agreed to an order setting aside the Labour Court determination, and the High Court made that order on consent. The judgment did not determine the separate unfair-dismissal proceedings mentioned in the case.