The Supreme Court has quashed the reckless endangerment convictions of Fergal Cagney and Ronan McGrath, ruling that the jury was not directed to consider whether either man had foreseen the serious risk alleged by the prosecution. It declined to order a retrial, citing the time since the incident and other circumstances.
The appeal concerned convictions under section 13 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997, following a jury trial in June 2002. Cagney and McGrath had also faced manslaughter charges relating to David Langan’s death, but the jury acquitted them of manslaughter. Their endangerment convictions were by a 10–2 majority. The Court of Criminal Appeal refused them leave to appeal in May 2004; the Supreme Court heard their appeals under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924.
The charges arose from an incident near Portobello Bridge in Dublin on 25 August 2000. The judgment said Langan had earlier thrown McGrath against shutters outside a nightclub. Later, witnesses described a confrontation between Langan and McGrath. Thomas Rooney testified that McGrath told Cagney to hit Langan, and that Cagney struck him near the left ear. Cagney told gardaí he had hit Langan in self-defence after Langan approached with raised hands, and said he had not heard McGrath’s instruction. Langan fell, did not regain consciousness and died in hospital five days later.
Medical evidence described a fracture at the back of Langan’s skull consistent with a fall against an immovable object. The State Pathologist said intoxication could have made him more likely to fall and that a push might have toppled him. The Supreme Court judgment noted the prosecution’s concern about proving that the alleged blow caused the death. The jury’s manslaughter acquittals left causation in doubt, while the endangerment charge concerned the risk of death or serious harm rather than proof that such harm was caused.
In the judgment delivered by Justice Hardiman, the Court held that reckless endangerment requires advertence to the substantial risk: a person must foresee the relevant risk and proceed regardless. The trial judge had quoted the statute but had not explained that requirement to the jury. The Supreme Court found this a grave defect affecting both appellants and quashed their convictions.
The judgment also criticised the way endangerment was presented to the jury as an alternative to manslaughter without explaining the relationship between the charges. Justice Hardiman’s discussion of a separate error in the jury’s reasonable-doubt direction was expressly obiter, as that issue had not been raised in the appeal grounds.
The Court did not order a retrial, referring to the more than seven years that had passed, the appellants’ good character and, in relation to one appellant, severe injuries in a road traffic accident. The judgment does not identify which appellant had suffered those injuries.