The Supreme Court dismissed Kenneth Dundon’s appeal over his continued detention under a European arrest warrant, ruling that expiry of the relevant 60-day period did not automatically entitle him to release.
The appeal concerned a High Court refusal of an application under Article 40.4 of the Constitution. The High Court had been satisfied that Mr Dundon was detained in accordance with law. He argued that the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 and the EU Framework Decision required his release because the High Court had not made a surrender order within 60 days of his arrest.
A warrant issued by a District Judge at Thames Magistrates Court in London on 29 January 2004 sought Mr Dundon’s surrender in connection with an alleged murder offence. The High Court endorsed it on 2 February. He was arrested in Limerick on 11 February and brought before the High Court in Dublin that day.
The High Court did not decide the surrender application on its initially scheduled date of 27 February. After adjournments, including time for undertakings to be provided and arguments about whether they complied with the Act, the court ruled on 14 May 2004 that they did comply and ordered surrender. The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Dundon’s appeal against that order on 16 March 2005. He then brought the separate Article 40.4 challenge that led to this appeal.
Delivering judgment on 19 December 2005, Mr Justice Geoghegan said the key question was whether expiry of the 60-day period ended the duty to execute the warrant. He concluded that it did not. The statutory provisions required authorities to report to the issuing authority and, where appropriate, Eurojust when the 60- or 90-day periods passed without a final decision; they did not provide for automatic release at that stage.
The judgment distinguished those periods from deadlines that expressly provide for release when missed. It said the pre-decision time limits were intended to promote speed and keep member states informed of performance. The court also held that, even if the limits could apply to individual cases, time spent on proceedings and appeals initiated by the arrested person should be discounted when calculating the period.
The judgment noted that a court could still consider bail or release where inordinate delay prejudiced an arrested person’s fundamental rights. That possibility did not create an automatic right to permanent release solely because the unextended 60-day period had expired. The appeal was dismissed.