The Court of Appeal allowed Bernadette Margaret Rose Devine’s appeal against an Irish High Court order supporting enforcement of a UK confiscation order. It ruled that the documents submitted by the UK authorities lacked a statement by or on behalf of the court that made the order, as required by the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Alan Mahon on 31 July 2015, concerned a confiscation order made against Devine by an English court in 2003. It required payment of £1,446,368.68. The Court of Appeal said the outstanding balance, including interest, was £1,738,900 as of August 2010, and continued to accrue interest after that date.
The UK authorities asked Ireland in 2010 to assist in enforcing the order against property in this jurisdiction. The High Court made a confiscation co-operation order in 2010, followed by consequential orders in 2013. Devine appealed, arguing, among other grounds, that the required statutory proofs were missing.
The central issue was whether a witness statement from Pennie Snape, a solicitor with the UK Crown Prosecution Service, satisfied the Act. Snape stated that the confiscation order remained in force and was not subject to appeal. The High Court had accepted that statement as sufficient, in part because it referred to the statutory provision and described the appeal history.
The Court of Appeal held that the law required the accompanying statement to come from the court that made the confiscation order or someone acting on its behalf. Snape’s statement did not identify her as a representative of that court, and her role as a prosecutor’s solicitor did not give her authority to speak for it. The court said the requirement was clear and mandatory, and non-compliance prevented an Irish court from making the requested order.
As a result, the Minister for Justice was not entitled to a confiscation co-operation order in respect of the property in Ireland listed in the High Court’s order. The appeal was allowed on that ground. The Court of Appeal did not decide Devine’s other grounds, including her limitation argument, because it was unnecessary to do so. The judgment addressed the statutory documentation for this request; it did not determine the other grounds of appeal.