The High Court refused an application by R. R. to add ten new grounds to a judicial review challenging a Refugee Appeals Tribunal decision, ruling that the delay in seeking the amendments was unexplained. It did, however, permit the applicant to reintroduce a previously withdrawn ground alleging irrationality.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Colm Mac Eochaidh on 25 July 2013, concerned a tribunal decision dated 24 February 2009. The judicial review proceedings began on 23 March 2009. At a hearing on 12 April 2013, the applicant sought to argue points that were not pleaded. The court then gave permission to bring the amendment motion addressed in this judgment.
The applicant’s counsel said the additional grounds had been overlooked when the original case was pleaded. The judge accepted that the statutory 14-day period for bringing a challenge could make it difficult to take instructions, research and prepare pleadings, and that lawyer error can sometimes provide a sufficient reason to extend time.
But the judge found that the applicant’s pleadings had been reviewed in the weeks before the hearing. Written submissions dated 21 March 2013 showed that the alleged pleading deficiency was known, or should have been known, by then. The applicant’s grounds were reduced by a letter sent on 9 April, yet no step was taken to seek the proposed amendments until the case was at hearing. The court found no explanation or justification for that later delay and refused the extension on that basis.
The respondent also argued that the proposed grounds were similar to those already pleaded and could have been included with greater diligence. The judge described that argument as attractive but said it was unnecessary to decide it.
The court separately said the four years between the start of proceedings and the amendment application did not, by itself, prevent an amendment. It accepted that lawyers in cases of this kind may defer active preparation until shortly before a hearing, and that the lengthy interval could be excused under the statutory “good and sufficient reason” standard.
The order allowed R. R. to reintroduce ground 15, which alleged that the tribunal had acted irrationally. The judge said the ground had been withdrawn shortly before the hearing and its restoration would cause no real prejudice to the respondent. The judgment does not decide the underlying judicial review challenge or the merits of the ten proposed new grounds.