The Supreme Court has directed the release of Matthew Armstrong from extradition proceedings, ruling that it would be oppressive in all the circumstances to deliver him to England for trial after he suffered a severe stroke.
In a judgment delivered on 10 February 2004, Mr Justice Geoghegan allowed Armstrong’s appeal under section 50 of the Extradition Act 1965, as amended. The appeal challenged the High Court’s refusal to order his release. The Supreme Court said it had heard submissions only on a particular aspect of that appeal; it did not decide the separate judicial review appeal or the remaining issues in the section 50 appeal.
The extradition request concerned an alleged offence on 29 June 1992. The High Court had found there was a lapse of time, including a 14-month period between August 1993 and November 1994 that the United Kingdom authorities had not explained. The Supreme Court considered whether the statutory requirements of exceptional delay and other exceptional circumstances were met, but its decision rested on additional medical evidence that arose after the High Court hearing.
Affidavits and medical reports before the Supreme Court described a stroke in February 2003 affecting Armstrong’s dominant left brain hemisphere. A neurologist’s August 2003 report recorded continuing expressive aphasia and severe right-sided weakness, and said Armstrong was not medically fit to be extradited or face trial at that stage. The report said his comprehension could not be reliably assessed and that recovery might continue for up to about two years after the stroke.
His wife’s affidavit described serious effects on daily life, including difficulty walking, reliance on a wheelchair, problems dressing and concentrating, and changes in his personality. The Attorney General’s counsel took a neutral position on the additional evidence and did not ask the court to adjourn the appeal in case of future recovery.
Justice Geoghegan said the new evidence constituted exceptional circumstances if such a finding was necessary. He concluded that, having regard to that evidence, delivery under section 47 would clearly be oppressive. The court therefore allowed the appeal and directed Armstrong’s release under section 50. The judgment did not determine the separate judicial review appeal or the other grounds of the section 50 appeal.