The High Court has directed a trial of two preliminary issues in Walter Croke’s claim against Waterford Crystal Limited and Irish Pensions Trust Limited (IPT): whether he may plead and rely on sections 41 and 71 of the Statute of Limitations 1957, and whether his claims against IPT are statute barred. The court did not decide those questions in this judgment.
Mr Justice Roderick Murphy made the directions on 28 July 2006, while considering IPT’s motion concerning the pleadings and trial management. Croke had been a member of the Waterford Pension Scheme from 9 March 1965 to 23 October 1992. He accepted a redundancy package in 1999 and began proceedings against the two defendants on 3 May 2001.
Croke’s case included allegations that Waterford had fraudulently concealed pension rights when he accepted redundancy. In a reply to IPT’s defence, he also alleged that IPT knew of his rights and failed to inform him, amounting to concealment under section 71(1)(b). Those were pleaded allegations, not findings by the court.
The dispute over the pleadings followed an earlier Supreme Court decision. In November 2004, the Supreme Court refused leave to amend the claim against IPT to add allegations of fraud and deliberate misconduct, while allowing amendments against Waterford. Croke later relied on correspondence between Waterford and IPT, disclosed in an affidavit filed in April 2006, as new evidence supporting his position. IPT argued that the later particulars could not get around the Supreme Court’s ruling.
Murphy J considered the affidavit material and the pension scheme booklet. He said the scheme rules and available options were known, or could have been known, to Croke at the relevant time, and that notification of leaving-service options was an obligation of Waterford rather than IPT. He also observed that the new affidavit material could not have been the basis for Croke’s October 2005 reply, which had already alleged IPT concealment. The judge said relying on the allegation “as a shield” did not appear to circumvent the Supreme Court’s ruling.
The court nevertheless directed that the two discrete issues be tried separately under Order 25. It cited the principle that a preliminary issue of law must be considered on the facts pleaded by the opposing party. The judgment left further directions on any additional pleadings, identification of issues, discovery and submissions to be heard. It made no final ruling on limitation or on whether Croke was entitled to rely on the specified statutory provisions.