The High Court has refused the defendants’ application to strike out Paula Malone’s defamation proceedings over a letter her former employer sent to her and copied to the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC). The court did not decide whether the letter was defamatory or whether absolute privilege applies. It held that the legal question was not clear enough to end the case at this stage.
Malone worked as a secretary for the National Association of Regional Game Councils (NARGC). She resigned on 5 May 2016, giving four weeks’ notice, but was told four days later that her contract had ended immediately. Her phone and laptop were taken from her office the following day. She sought the return of personal data on the devices but was unsuccessful.
After Malone complained to the DPC, the commissioner wrote to the employer on 11 August 2017, saying the complaints would be investigated and asking the employer to respond to Malone’s data access request within 10 days, with a copy to the DPC. The employer’s letter of 21 August 2017 raised a series of issues, including allegations concerning Malone’s resignation, NARGC records and property, and recordings of conversations. Malone’s claim alleges that the letter conveyed meanings including that she pursued a fraudulent court action, took NARGC property and participated in an illegal recording of a government official. Those are pleaded allegations, not findings by the court.
The defendants argued that the letter was protected by absolute privilege under common law and section 17 of the Defamation Act 2009. They said the DPC’s investigation involved the exercise of a judicial function. They also argued that the letter was made during Malone’s judicial review proceedings seeking to compel the DPC to deal with her complaint. Separately, they said her pleaded meanings were insufficiently particularised.
Justice Ní Raifeartaigh said the strike-out application could succeed only if it was clear that absolute privilege applied. She considered the proposed privilege arguments, including the nature of the DPC’s functions and procedures, the possible legal consequences of its decisions, and the relevance of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. She said the issues were novel and required fuller legal argument; the court’s observations were provisional, not a final determination of the defence.
The judge also said it was unlikely, though not definitively decided, that the employer’s letter was written “in the course of” the judicial review proceedings. She rejected inadequate particularisation as a basis to strike out the case, noting that amendments or further particulars could be pursued if needed. The court refused the defendants’ motion. The defamation proceedings therefore continue; the ruling does not determine liability or the truth of the allegations.