The High Court dismissed a partnership’s application to set aside part of an interim arbitration award concerning fees for additional architectural services. It also refused the partnership’s requests for an interpretation of the award, holding that the Model Law gave the Court no power to compel either the architect or the arbitrator to provide one.
The dispute arose under a 2007 agreement between the Snoddy & Browne Partnership and the architect. It set a rate of €100 per hour for abnormal or additional services, which were to be authorised and agreed in writing by both parties before work began. The architect claimed €52,400 plus VAT for 524 hours of additional work. The partnership disputed the hours and said the work had not been authorised in writing.
In an interim award, the arbitrator found that 500 hours was a reasonable period for the work. He also found that, although the services had not been specifically authorised in writing, a partnership member had confirmed that the partnership knew the architect was doing the work. The arbitrator concluded that written instruction was not a condition precedent to payment. Applying the agreed hourly rate as inclusive of VAT, he awarded €41,320 for the additional services.
The partnership argued in the High Court that the arbitrator had gone beyond the dispute submitted to arbitration by awarding payment on an equitable basis, despite the absence of a pleaded quantum meruit claim and the parties’ not having authorised an equitable award. The Court rejected that account of the award. It found that the arbitrator had decided the claim under the contract and had assessed the hours by reference to the evidence, including evidence from the partnership’s expert. The Court said the arbitrator might have been wrong about the contractual effect of the written-authorisation term, but it expressed no view on that question.
The Court held that the excess-of-authority ground for setting aside an award is narrowly construed and cannot be used to second-guess an arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract. It therefore refused to set aside the relevant part of the award. Because no ground for setting aside had been established, the Court also had no power to suspend the proceedings and remit the matter to the arbitrator under Article 34(4).
The Court further held that Article 33 conferred no jurisdiction on it to compel an interpretation. It considered that the award was not ambiguous and did not require clarification. The application was dismissed. The judgment did not decide whether the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract was correct.