The Supreme Court has allowed a Medical Council appeal against part of a High Court order that barred further professional-conduct inquiries into complaints against retired surgeon Michael Shine. The appeal concerned complaints that had also been the subject of criminal proceedings ending in acquittals. The Court’s ruling addressed the permitted grounds for judicial review and did not determine the complaints themselves.
In a judgment delivered by Mr Justice Kearns on 14 July 2008, the Court said the Medical Council’s appeal was strictly limited to the High Court’s prohibition on inquiries into complaints considered at a 2003 criminal trial. The High Court had treated further inquiries into those complaints as exposing Shine to “double jeopardy”.
The Supreme Court said that ground had not been included in the leave granted for the judicial review proceedings. Nor had Shine applied to amend the grounds before or during the High Court hearing. The Court also found that the separate claim that it would be unfair to proceed with inquiries following the acquittals had not been raised; fairness had been argued in the context of delay.
The Court said judicial review leave defines the grounds a case may address, and that amendments are permitted only in limited circumstances. It concluded that the High Court had granted relief on a ground outside the permitted case. The appeal was allowed.
The Court added that this was not one criminal trial followed by another: the proposed Fitness to Practise Committee inquiry had a different context and purpose, including public protection. It was “far from convinced” that fairness would normally prevent an inquiry into allegations that had been the subject of a criminal trial ending in acquittal, but said it was unnecessary to examine that question in detail.
The underlying complaints remain allegations in this judgment. The Court’s decision did not determine whether they were true, and the judgment does not set out the effect of allowing the appeal on the remaining terms of the High Court order.