The Supreme Court has rejected an attempt by the Eastern Health Board to rely on a ministerial statement made in Dáil Éireann when interpreting legislation governing hospital charges arising from road traffic injuries.
The issue arose after Derek Crilly suffered serious injuries in a road accident and successfully sued T.J. Farrington Limited and John O’Connor for negligence. He was awarded damages of £1,667,078.
Because section 2 of the Health (Amendment) Act 1986 applied, the Health Board imposed charges for the hospital treatment provided to Crilly. Those charges were ultimately recoverable from the defendants and their insurer, FBD Insurance plc.
A dispute then developed over how the Health Board could calculate those charges. The Board argued that it could use an “average daily cost”, calculated by dividing a hospital’s annual expenditure by the number of occupied bed days, excluding capital and depreciation costs.
In support of that interpretation, the Board relied on a statement made by a minister while the legislation was passing through the Dáil. The minister had said the charge would normally be the average daily cost per hospital bed.
Mr Justice Murray held that the statement should not be considered when interpreting the Act. He said the courts must ascertain the objective intention of the Oireachtas from the legislation it enacted, rather than the subjective intentions of individual ministers, legislators or drafters.
The judge also identified practical concerns. Routine reliance on parliamentary debates could increase legal costs, create uncertainty and require lawyers to examine political debates whenever statutory wording became contentious. It could also risk affecting the legislative process itself.
The Supreme Court therefore maintained the traditional common-law rule excluding parliamentary debates as an aid to statutory interpretation.
Murray J said no reliance should be placed on the ministerial statement concerning section 2. On the separate substantive interpretation of the Health Act provision, he agreed with Ms Justice Denham and the order she proposed, but the details of that determination are not set out in this judgment.