Judgment: 2020-12-17 · Court archive

High Court awards costs of injunction application, with execution stayed until trial

The plaintiffs succeeded on their interlocutory injunction application. The court ordered the defendants to pay its costs but stayed execution pending trial, where the underlying questions remain open.

High Court · [2020] IEHC 693

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Emma Thompson
  • Beautiful Minds Creche and Montessori Limited (Plaintiff)
  • Stephen Tennant
  • Promentoria (Aran) Limited (Defendant)
  • Nuala Butler (Judge)
What

The plaintiffs succeeded on their interlocutory injunction application. The court ordered the defendants to pay its costs but stayed execution pending trial, where the underlying questions remain open.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

Justice Butler concluded that she could justly decide costs at the interlocutory stage. As the plaintiffs had succeeded despite the defendants contesting both whether a fair question to be tried had been raised and where the balance of convenience lay, she ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the injunction application. However, the order does not resolve the underlying disputes: the judge stayed its execution pending trial because the questions may not ultimately be decided in the plaintiffs’ favour.

The High Court has ordered Stephen Tennant and Promentoria (Aran) Limited to pay the costs of an interlocutory injunction application brought by Emma Thompson and Beautiful Minds Creche and Montessori Limited. The order was made on 17 December 2020, with execution stayed until the trial of the action.

The costs ruling followed an injunction granted against the defendants in a judgment delivered on 12 November 2020. The plaintiffs sought costs under the Rules of the Superior Courts and the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. The defendants argued that costs should be reserved to the trial or made costs in the cause.

Justice Nuala Butler said the rules generally require the court to decide costs when an interlocutory application is determined, unless it is not possible to adjudicate justly at that stage. The possibility that the trial judge might be better placed to assess costs later did not, by itself, meet that test.

The injunction application had succeeded on two issues that raised a fair question to be tried. One concerned whether an expressed or implied tenancy existed between the second plaintiff and the second defendant. The plaintiffs accepted that this factual issue would be revisited at trial. The other concerned whether the receiver had validly accepted his appointment; the plaintiffs said that issue turned on documents whose legal consequences remained disputed.

The defendants focused their costs submissions on the tenancy issue, arguing that limited affidavit evidence had been before the court and that oral evidence or discovery at trial might produce a different picture. The judge noted that the plaintiffs had provided positive evidence on the issue, including the first plaintiff’s averments and documents relating to alleged rent payments. The defendants relied on an inference from their records given by a witness without personal involvement or knowledge of the events. The judge also noted that the defendants had not explained why costs should not follow the event on the receiver-appointment issue.

Justice Butler concluded that she could justly decide costs at the interlocutory stage. As the plaintiffs had succeeded despite the defendants contesting both whether a fair question to be tried had been raised and where the balance of convenience lay, she ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of the injunction application. However, the order does not resolve the underlying disputes: the judge stayed its execution pending trial because the questions may not ultimately be decided in the plaintiffs’ favour.

The judge rejected the plaintiffs’ separate submission that the defendants had acted aggressively or unreasonably. She said the defendants were entitled to dispute the plaintiffs’ request to restrain them from exercising powers they believed arose under a charge. The substantive proceedings will determine whether that belief was correct.

Read the original court judgment

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