The High Court ruled in favour of a property seller who received €99,000 from architect Frank Crowley, finding it would be unconscionable to let Crowley’s estate deny the transaction after the seller abandoned proceedings against developer Clem Kenny.
The judgment, delivered by Ms Justice Iseult O’Malley on 30 May 2016, concerns an appeal from a Circuit Court order in a claim for specific performance. The plaintiff, Danny Prunty, had agreed to sell a site outside Longford town for €110,000. Kenny signed a contract in 2004 “in trust”; an €11,000 deposit was paid, and the balance was not paid by the closing date.
Prunty began High Court proceedings against Kenny in February 2005. He later said Crowley offered to take over the transaction. The solicitors’ correspondence in June 2005 discussed Crowley completing on the terms agreed with Kenny, but the judge found no concluded contract arose from those discussions.
The arrangement then shifted. Crowley’s solicitor said in August that Crowley could not take over Kenny’s contractual obligations and proposed a new contract after Kenny’s contract was cleared. In November, she sent €99,000 “on trust and to our order”, asking Prunty to discontinue the proceedings and serve a forfeiture notice on Kenny. The letter said the money could be released if the transaction could then be freely completed, while also stating that no contract existed until formal execution.
Prunty served the forfeiture notice and believed the notice of discontinuance had been filed. It had not been filed at that point, though the omission was later rectified. Kenny and his solicitor were told the case was at an end. Prunty’s solicitor released the €99,000 to him in December 2005 after the forfeiture period expired.
In April 2006, Crowley’s solicitor said Crowley would not proceed and demanded the money back. The estate’s counterclaim sought its return.
The judge held that the November letter was an unequivocal inducement: if Prunty surrendered his claim against Kenny, he could have the €99,000. Prunty had abandoned what the judge considered a strong claim, and the fact the discontinuance had not initially been lodged did not change the result because all parties believed it had been and Kenny had been told the matter was over.
The court found it unconscionable to leave Prunty without either claim and made an order in his favour. The judgment extract does not specify the precise terms of that order.