The High Court has upheld the mandatory retirement age of 70 for sheriffs, finding that it is compatible with EU equality law. Ms Justice Siobhán Phelan refused the relief sought by Seamus Mallon, a sheriff for Cavan and Monaghan who challenged the rule before he reached 70 in May 2022.
Mallon argued that the age limit under the Court Officers Act 1945 discriminated on grounds of age and lacked objective justification. He also challenged the Government’s April 2021 response declining a request from the Sheriff’s Association to extend the retirement age. The State argued that the retirement requirement came directly from legislation, and relied on aims including workforce planning, age balance, intergenerational fairness and consistency across the public service.
The judge held that the refusal to pursue amending legislation was not a decision open to challenge by judicial review. However, she ruled that the High Court could still consider whether the legislation was compatible with EU law, and that Mallon could pursue the broader declaratory relief sought despite an alternative route through the Workplace Relations Commission.
The court accepted that compulsory retirement based on age is prima facie discriminatory. It found, however, that the State had established legitimate aims for the policy, including planning for retirement and recruitment, making opportunities for younger people, and maintaining a balance between generations. The judge also found that the rule was appropriate and necessary to those aims.
In reaching that conclusion, she considered the sheriff’s distinct statutory regime, the lack of an occupational pension, and comparisons with coroners, whose retirement age was raised to 72, and public servants with accrued rights to no compulsory retirement age. She found that the different arrangements did not make the rule for sheriffs unlawfully discriminatory.
The court concluded there was no incompatibility between the 1945 Act’s retirement rule and the EU Framework Directive. It refused the relief sought. The parties had agreed to defer the separate question of damages until after the primary issue was decided; the judgment does not determine that question.