The High Court has ruled that Mark Monks did not establish a right to McCabe’s field beside Dublin Airport, rejecting his claim of ownership based on years of use. The court held that Dublin Airport Authority was the registered owner and that Mr Monks had not displaced its title through adverse possession.
The proceedings were brought by the Irish Aviation Authority and daa public limited company. They sought orders to prevent interference with construction of a new Air Traffic Visual Control Tower and a declaration that Mr Monks had no interest in the field. They also sought a finding that he breached a 2003 High Court order and damages for trespass.
The judgment recounts that Aer Rianta bought the field, among other properties, from Mr Monks’s father, James Monks, in 1992. James Monks signed a statutory declaration stating that he had agreed to sell the field and no longer had an interest in it. A 2003 High Court order later required Mark Monks to deliver up possession. In a 2004 settlement, he agreed to give up possession of McCabe’s field.
Mark Monks maintained that the field was his. He and family witnesses described activities there over many years, including selling car parts, logs and Christmas trees. The judge found that some activity took place, but it was intermittent, concealed and not a business. The field appeared largely overgrown in photographs considered by the court.
The court applied the principles governing adverse possession, including the need to show factual possession and an intention to possess. It found that the Dublin Airport Authority’s title was supported by the land register and by acts of possession, including caretaker arrangements, hedge cutting and surveys. The defendant’s activities were insufficient to displace the registered owner.
The judge said the plaintiffs were entitled to orders under relief items 1, 2, 3 and 5 of their statement of claim. The judgment does not set out those items’ wording in its conclusion. The court reserved relief item 4, saying it would hear the parties on the appropriate order in light of the 2004 settlement. It also deferred the question of how and when trespass damages should be dealt with because the plaintiffs said they could not yet quantify them. The judgment does not state the final terms of those outstanding matters.