The Court of Criminal Appeal has dismissed Yu Jie’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, finding that none of three proposed questions qualified for certification under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice McCracken on 25 November 2005, concerned an application for a certificate that the decision involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and that an appeal was desirable in the public interest. The court considered the proposed questions separately.
The first concerned whether gardaí must stop questioning a suspect who has been advised of the right to silence and invokes it. The court said the Supreme Court’s decision in Lavery v Member in Charge Carrickmacross Garda Station had already addressed the matter. It also said that stopping questioning in those circumstances would undermine the purpose of detention under section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, and that the suspect’s rights were protected by advice about the right to silence.
The second proposed question concerned the use of interpreters during garda questioning, including whether a suspect’s solicitor and an interpreter chosen by the suspect should be present. The court said the issue was factual and for the trial judge, potentially at a voir dire, and ultimately the jury. It noted that the jury had been made aware of the allegations and could decide whether possible interpreter errors had prejudiced the questioning or any statement. The court found no question of law arose for certification.
The third question concerned fingerprints and palm prints taken after Jie’s arrest on a murder charge in March 2001. After an order sending him forward for trial was quashed in July 2002, he was released from custody by the governor of Cloverhill Prison and re-arrested and charged the following day. He was later tried and convicted on the original charges.
Jie argued that his release meant the first proceedings had been discontinued or that he had been discharged, requiring the prints to be destroyed under section 8 of the 1984 Act. The court rejected the argument that the prison governor’s release amounted to a discharge under that section, saying the governor had no power to discontinue proceedings or discharge an accused in that sense. It held that the case’s circumstances did not bring Jie within section 8 and that no point of law should be certified.
The court dismissed the application. It did not grant a certificate for an appeal to the Supreme Court.