The High Court has refused an applicant’s request to stop his prosecution on two burglary charges, finding that his efforts to evade arrest substantially contributed to the delay in executing bench warrants.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Hedigan on 12 February 2009, concerned only the burglary charges. The alleged burglary took place on 9 August 1999. A separate dangerous-driving charge, relating to an alleged incident in 2001, was outside the scope of the application.
The applicant sought an injunction restraining the burglary prosecution. He argued that the delay was excessive and created a real and substantial risk that he could not receive a fair trial, particularly because he had lost contact with a potential witness, Paddy O’Connor.
The judge reviewed evidence from four Garda witnesses, including affidavits and cross-examination. He said the applicant had failed to appear in court in May 2000 on the burglary charges. After a separate dangerous-driving charge in October 2001, the applicant initially gave a false name, incorrect address and false date of birth, the judgment said. Garda efforts to execute the warrants included enquiries at addresses in County Offaly, Templemore and Finglas. The judge found that the applicant’s false details and changes of address, including a substantial period outside Ireland, had considerably hampered the search.
The applicant argued that O’Connor could have supported his account that he had previously been in the house, explaining the presence of his fingerprints. The judge considered that evidence’s possible exculpatory value questionable. The householder, Mrs Margaret Smyth, had stated in the Book of Evidence that the biscuit tin from which the applicant’s fingerprints were taken was kept locked in a gun press. The applicant also raised the possibility that O’Connor could provide an alibi. The judge said any loss of contact was attributable to the applicant’s own efforts to evade justice, and that the trial judge could address any inability to locate the witness when weighing possible prejudice.
The judgment said trial prohibition is reserved for exceptional cases where an unfair trial risk cannot be avoided through appropriate rulings or directions. Weighing the applicant’s claim against society’s interest in prosecuting serious crime, the judge refused the relief sought. The ruling does not determine the applicant’s guilt or innocence; it rejects the application to halt the burglary prosecution.