The Supreme Court has allowed Matthew Armstrong’s appeal against the refusal to order his release from extradition proceedings, finding that his medical condition and the prospect of a complex trial made it unjust and oppressive to deliver him to England.
In a judgment delivered on 10 February 2004, Denham J. considered an appeal under section 50(2)(bbb) of the Extradition Act 1965, as amended. The court accepted further evidence about events after the High Court’s decision, including medical evidence concerning a stroke Armstrong suffered in February 2003. The State did not oppose receiving the evidence, and it was not contradicted.
Armstrong had been arrested in Bray, County Wicklow, on 12 May 1995 under a warrant said to have been issued by a London magistrate. The warrant alleged that he possessed 15.10 kilograms of brown powder containing heroin, with intent to supply it, in June 1992. Armstrong denied the alleged offence. The judgment records that proceedings against him in London had not yet begun and that he was sought for trial, not sentencing or completion of a sentence.
A doctor’s report described right-sided paralysis, marked expressive aphasia and uncertainty about Armstrong’s ability to understand criminal proceedings. His wife’s affidavit described the stroke’s effects on his daily life. The Supreme Court found that he had ongoing comprehension and communication difficulties. It also considered that his defence would involve a complicated situation, including an alleged police “sting”, and that a complex trial could be expected.
The High Court had refused release in January 2002, concluding that, despite the lapse of time and unusual circumstances, it would not be unjust, oppressive or invidious to deliver Armstrong up. On appeal, Denham J. treated lapse of time and other exceptional circumstances as established, and considered whether delivery would be unjust, oppressive or invidious in all the circumstances. The judgment said the Supreme Court could use its statutory discretion to consider the new evidence, while noting that a future case could raise separately whether such evidence amounts to exceptional circumstances.
The court concluded that Armstrong’s mental impairment and physical disabilities, together with the prospect of a complex trial, made delivery unjust and oppressive under section 50(2)(bbb). It allowed the appeal. The judgment does not record a separate order on the second, judicial review appeal; counsel had reserved the right to proceed with it.