The Supreme Court has dismissed two appeals concerning applications for freezing orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, ruling that the proceedings were not barred by time limits and did not require property to be linked to specific offences.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Geoghegan on 23 February 2005, covered appeals brought by defendants identified as A.F. and E.H. The court said both proceedings were applications for orders under section 3 of the Act, which restrain a person from dealing with property. References in the summonses to eventual orders under section 4 were surplusage. The court did not decide whether a section 4 order amounts to forfeiture for limitation purposes.
In the F. case, A.F. had appealed the High Court President’s refusal to dismiss the proceedings. Her motion argued, among other things, that the plaintiff had to identify the specific crime linked to each item of property and provide particulars making that link. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Act did not require this: a sufficient case could be made using opinion evidence that property represented, directly or indirectly, the proceeds of crime. Requiring a link to a particular offence would make the Act unworkable, the judgment said.
The court also rejected the limitation arguments. It held that section 3 applications were not subject to a limitation period under either the 1996 Act or the Statute of Limitations 1957. A section 3 order freezes a person’s interest in property but does not deprive them of it, the judgment said, so it is not a forfeiture. The court reserved its view on whether section 4 operates as a forfeiture.
In the H. appeal, the court rejected an argument that a section 3 application had to be moved in open court within 21 days of an interim order. It held that the application was “brought” in time when the proceedings were issued or filed; actual hearing within that period was not required absent express statutory language.
The court said questions about proceeds from foreign crimes, and an argument concerning whether some property belonged to the estate of A.F.’s late husband, could be raised in the High Court when the section 3 application was heard. It did not decide those matters on appeal. The judgment also said a hearsay-evidence challenge had not been argued in the High Court and was not properly before the Supreme Court.