Judgment: 2005-03-02 · Court archive

Supreme Court stops firearms prosecution after excessive delay in Darren Blood case

Supreme Court ·

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Darren Bernard Blood (Applicant)
  • Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
  • Stephen Murphy
  • Martin McHugh
  • Mrs Justice McGuinness
What

Supreme Court stops firearms prosecution after excessive delay in Darren Blood case

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • 27 Dunamore Crescent
  • Carnew
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The Supreme Court has stopped the prosecution of Darren Bernard Blood on firearms charges dating from 1994 after finding that later delays in bringing the case to trial breached his right to reasonable expedition.

The Supreme Court has stopped the prosecution of Darren Bernard Blood on firearms charges dating from 1994 after finding that later delays in bringing the case to trial breached his right to reasonable expedition.

Blood faced two charges alleging that, during April 1994 at 27 Dunamore Crescent, Tallaght, he possessed a nine-millimetre Mauser pistol and six rounds of ammunition in circumstances suggesting no lawful purpose.

The allegations emerged from investigations connected with the killing of Stephen Murphy at Carnew, Co Wexford, in April 1994. Blood was arrested in 1994 and again in 1996 but was not charged with the firearms offences until July 1999. He was returned for trial in January 2001.

The Supreme Court divided the delay into two periods.

Mrs Justice McGuinness held that the first period, running to March 1998, was justified. Prosecutors had decided to wait until proceedings against Martin McHugh, a potential prosecution witness, were completed before relying on his evidence. The court said decisions about when and on what evidence to prosecute were primarily matters for the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The position changed after McHugh's case ended. The judgment identified a series of later delays, including five months before news of his conviction reached the DPP, time lost because Blood's file could not be found, further correspondence over what charges should be brought and a two-and-a-half-month delay between final directions and Blood's arrest. A scheduled deposition hearing was also lost when the prosecution failed to attend.

The court described the cumulative delay between March 1998 and January 2001 as inordinate or excessive and not properly excused.

Although Blood had not proved strong specific prejudice, the court took account of the long lapse of time, his loss of contact with members of the motorcycling community who might have been witnesses, and the risk that memories had faded.

The Supreme Court allowed his appeal and granted an injunction restraining the prosecution from proceeding.

Read the original court judgment

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