The Supreme Court ruled that an arrest was unlawful after a Garda sergeant handcuffed a cooperative drink-driving suspect under a policy of restraining every person arrested on suspicion of drink-driving, regardless of their behaviour or the circumstances.
The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Fennelly on 18 February 2014, answered questions referred by the Circuit Court under section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act 1947. The Court concluded that the handcuffs were applied as an integral part of the arrest and that the officer’s decision was predetermined rather than based on an assessment of the individual case.
The case arose from an incident on 21 September 2007. The Circuit Court’s stated facts said Sergeant Sean Moyles saw Peter Cullen driving erratically on Littlepace Road in Dublin 15. After stopping him, the sergeant formed the opinion that he had consumed an intoxicant. A roadside breath test gave a “fail” reading, and the sergeant arrested him. Cullen was taken to Blanchardstown Garda Station, where a later breath specimen recorded 71 microgrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of breath.
According to the case stated, Moyles accepted that Cullen had cooperated throughout and had neither used nor threatened force to avoid arrest. The officer said his policy was to handcuff anyone arrested under section 49 of the Road Traffic Act because, based on his experience, such people might become abusive or resist. The Circuit Court judge found the prosecution had failed to prove that the handcuffing was lawful, proportionate or justified.
The Supreme Court said Gardaí may use handcuffs when an officer genuinely considers them necessary in the particular circumstances. That assessment must take account of the individual and the situation. Here, the blanket policy left no room for a peaceful, cooperative suspect, and the officer had not exercised that case-specific judgment. The Court held that the arrest was unlawful.
The Court answered the first question in the case stated in the affirmative and said the arrest was unlawful in response to the second. It expressly left unresolved whether there had been a breach of constitutional rights and whether the exclusionary rule required evidence obtained afterward to be excluded, saying it was unnecessary to decide those issues. The judgment does not state a final order on the underlying charge; it notes that the District Court order was not before the Supreme Court.