The Court of Criminal Appeal refused Christopher Griffin’s application for a certificate allowing an appeal to the Supreme Court over an absent witness and a trial judge’s comments about media coverage.
The application was made under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924, as amended. The court said a certificate required a point of law of exceptional public importance that arose from its earlier decision, and a public interest in referring it to the Supreme Court. It found that neither requirement was met.
One proposed question concerned the absence at Griffin’s 2006 retrial of a witness identified in the judgment as MD. She was the complainant’s mother and Griffin’s long-standing partner. She had given a statement to gardaí in 2003 that the prosecution said recorded an admission by Griffin. At the first trial, she denied in oral evidence that he had made the admission and was declared hostile. She did not attend the retrial after becoming ill.
The defence argued that her earlier evidence could have challenged the complainant’s credibility and disputed the alleged admission. The trial judge refused to discharge the jury, finding MD unfit to attend and that she would have no evidence to contribute. The Court of Criminal Appeal’s 2009 decision upheld the trial judge’s exercise of discretion.
Griffin’s certificate application argued that the earlier decision imposed an onus on an accused to show that an absent witness’s evidence was centrally supportive of his innocence, or to seek a warrant to bring the witness to court. The court rejected that reading. It said the earlier decision did not impose either obligation: the trial judge must assess the witness’s centrality after hearing the parties’ submissions, and the judge had offered the defence the option of a warrant, which it declined.
The second proposed question concerned a trial judge’s statement during applications about media coverage, including: “the trial is going to proceed to a conclusion.” Griffin argued the statement was a blanket ruling that discouraged further applications to discharge the jury. The court said it was not a ruling barring later applications. It noted that further applications were made and heard, and that its 2009 decision had also rejected the appeal ground on its substance.
The court concluded that neither proposed question arose from its 2009 decision and that the application did not establish exceptional public importance or a public interest in a Supreme Court appeal. It refused the certificate.