The High Court has refused an application by Thistle Bloodstock Limited to prevent racehorse The Tartan Spartan from running while its ownership is disputed. Mr Justice Allen declined the interlocutory injunction and directed that the action proceed to an early trial.
The company said it owned the horse and was entitled to its return. It argued that the horse had left its stud farm in July 2019 to be taken for slaughter, and that it did not authorise his sale to trainer Philip Fenton. Fenton said he bought the horse in good faith, paid €2,000 by cheque and spent time and money training him.
The judgment recounts differing accounts of how the sale was arranged. Horse dealer Jim Derwin said he agreed to buy horses after being contacted by Declan Glynn, then sold The Tartan Spartan to Fenton. Fenton recalled that lorry driver Mark Doolin first contacted him, and that he inspected the horse before agreeing the price with Derwin. The court did not finally resolve those factual disputes.
Justice Allen found a bona fide issue for trial over whether Glynn became owner when collecting the horse and its passport, and whether Glynn or Derwin acted as the company’s mercantile agents or had apparent authority to sell the horse for a purpose other than slaughter. The judge said those issues could not be finally decided on an interlocutory application.
The judgment also addressed the company’s initial application for an interim injunction, which had been granted ex parte by Mr Justice Heslin. The company accepted that an affidavit statement that the horse’s passport had not been transferred was false; it was corrected in a supplemental affidavit after the injunction was made. Justice Allen said there was substance to the complaint of lack of candour and described the original statement as grossly careless if the deponent knew the passport had to accompany the horse.
The company had sought an interim mandatory order returning the horse, but did not press that request at the hearing. Its proposal was that Fenton keep the horse in training but not race him. The judge was not persuaded by the unsupported apprehension that racing would cause a catastrophic breakdown, or that Fenton intended to act other than properly and in accordance with veterinary advice. He was also not satisfied that racing the horse would conflict with animal welfare.
Justice Allen found the balance of convenience against the order sought. The horse therefore remained in Fenton’s possession and training, with no interim bar on racing imposed by this application. The court directed an early trial; it did not determine final ownership.