The Court of Appeal has dismissed Stephen O’Reilly’s appeal against his conviction for causing serious harm, finding that the trial judge made an error in directing the jury about accomplice evidence but that the error caused no miscarriage of justice.
O’Reilly was convicted by a jury in the Dublin Central Criminal Court in July 2013 of causing serious harm and producing an article capable of inflicting serious injury in a manner likely unlawfully to intimidate another person. He received a 12-year prison sentence, with the final three years suspended on conditions. The Court of Appeal judgment, delivered on 20 March 2017, dealt only with the appeal against conviction, not the separate sentence appeal.
The case concerned the stabbing of Stephen O’Brien in August 2011. O’Brien told the trial jury that O’Reilly and Gerard Keogh came to his flat, that O’Reilly stabbed him and that he handed over his bank card and PIN after being asked for them. O’Brien said €180 was later taken from his account. Keogh denied taking part in a robbery but testified that O’Reilly stabbed O’Brien. O’Reilly’s appeal was argued on two grounds concerning the jury directions.
The appeal court held that the trial judge’s warning about Keogh’s evidence did not meet the requirement for a full accomplice warning. The jury should have been told that it was dangerous to convict on an accomplice’s evidence without corroboration, while also being told that they could rely on it if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was true. The court said the warning actually given, to treat Keogh’s evidence with caution, was insufficient.
However, the appeal court concluded that the jury would inevitably have found Keogh’s evidence corroborated by some or all of the other evidence identified by the prosecution, including O’Brien’s account, evidence placing O’Reilly and Keogh near the scene around the time of the attack, and O’Reilly’s initial denial that he knew O’Brien. Applying the statutory proviso, the court found no miscarriage of justice and rejected that ground.
The second ground challenged the decision to leave the serious harm charge with the jury and the directions on what serious harm meant. The court said it did not need to settle whether “injury” in the statutory definition refers to the harm suffered alone or can also include the act causing it. Even on the narrower interpretation advanced by O’Reilly, it found evidence capable of meeting the definition.
That evidence included the collapsed lung, the paramedic’s assessment that O’Brien had life-threatening injuries, the nurse’s evidence that he was critical before stabilisation, and the need for surgery and a chest drain. The court said a substantial risk of death or serious impairment may satisfy the definition even if prompt treatment quickly reduces the risk or impairment. It found no error in the trial judge’s decision to leave the charge with the jury or in the jury directions, and rejected the second ground.
The court dismissed the appeal against conviction, concluding that the trial was satisfactory and the conviction safe.