The High Court has refused Ryanair DAC leave to appeal a ruling concerning planning permission for an underpass at Dublin Airport, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise a suitable point of law of exceptional public importance.
The application followed a February judgment that rejected Ryanair’s challenge to An Bord Pleanála’s decision. The dispute had originally included a range of domestic and EU law grounds, but most were withdrawn before the hearing. The remaining focus was an inspector’s description of a short-term reduction in aircraft stands as an “immaterial” departure from a local area plan (LAP), rather than addressing whether the departure was justified.
In his judgment delivered on 4 April 2025, Mr Justice Humphreys said the inspector had agreed with Ryanair’s interpretation of the plan: the development contravened it. He found no misinterpretation, and said the wording issue did not make a difference to the outcome. The LAP had a “have regard to” status, rather than requiring the Board to comply with it, and the court found that the statutory provision Ryanair relied on to make the distinction legally significant did not apply.
Ryanair proposed asking whether a decision-maker’s material legal error in interpreting a relevant LAP could justify certiorari without an applicable legal standard. The judge said that question did not arise from the case as pleaded or from the judgment. He also considered the issue, at most, an application of established law to the particular facts, rather than a pure point of law. He said the alleged error was harmless and the decision could be read in a way that was lawful and valid.
The court noted that the underpass works entailed the loss of two aircraft stands. It also referred to a separate live application by daa which, the judgment said, would produce a net gain of 33 stands, and to evidence that the underpass was considered necessary for safety because vehicles would otherwise cross an active runway or taxiway. The judge said the appeal should not turn into a review of the project’s merits.
The court dismissed the leave-to-appeal application. If the Supreme Court grants a leapfrog appeal, costs of the leave application will be costs in that appeal; otherwise, there is no order as to those costs. The court also directed that, unless a costs application is filed within seven days, there will be no order as to the costs of the application to reopen the earlier judgment. The underlying proceedings had already been dismissed, with no order as to costs up to that point; the final order was to be perfected if no costs application was made.