The Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the Minister for Health and Children and the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal, ruling that D.B. could not appeal a hepatitis compensation award after accepting it in writing. The court also found that the appeal was outside the statutory time limit, even if a right of appeal had remained, and held that the tribunal had standing to seek to be heard in the High Court.
D.B. had applied to a non-statutory compensation scheme before the Hepatitis C Compensation Tribunal Act 1997 took effect. His claim had not been heard when the statutory tribunal was established on 1 November 1997, so it was transferred to that tribunal. The tribunal made an award on 4 November 1997. D.B. accepted it in writing on 24 November and agreed to waive related rights of action and discontinue proceedings.
He lodged an appeal in the High Court on 22 April 1999. The Minister argued that acceptance barred an appeal under section 5(9) of the Act and that the appeal was late. The tribunal supported those objections. The High Court adjourned the substantive appeal while it considered the preliminary issues. O’Neill J. ruled against the Minister and tribunal, and they appealed to the Supreme Court on specified questions of law.
In a judgment delivered by Geoghegan J. on 26 March 2003, the Supreme Court interpreted section 5(9) as giving claimants three alternatives: accept the award, reject it or appeal it within the permitted period. It held that acceptance ended the right to appeal. The court further said the statutory time limit did not arise once the award had been accepted.
The court addressed the timing issue on the alternative assumption that D.B. could appeal. The period had been extended by regulation to 23 November 1998, but D.B. filed in April 1999. The court rejected an argument that parts of the tribunal’s assessment could be appealed separately under a different time limit, holding that the appeal was against the award and subject to the statutory limit.
On the tribunal’s participation, the Supreme Court said it should have a prima facie right to ask the High Court to hear it on a point particularly relevant to the tribunal, with the High Court deciding whether its participation was relevant and appropriate. In this case, the tribunal had a legitimate interest in making representations.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on all three specified grounds. It did not determine the substantive merits or amount of D.B.’s compensation award in this appeal.