The High Court refused Ryanair Limited and Ryanair Holdings plc leave to serve notices to cross-examine the defendants’ discovery-affidavit deponents, and declined to order their attendance for cross-examination.
The ruling concerned a discovery-related application in the plaintiffs’ defamation proceedings. The plaintiffs allege that a 2013 “Pilot Update” published on Ryanair Pilot Group headed notepaper defamed them, including by suggesting market manipulation and misleading investors. The court stressed that the truth of those claims was for another court to decide.
The plaintiffs had also applied to strike out the defence for want of discovery, obtain further discovery and inspect certain redacted documents. That application was part-heard. At a hearing on 9 February, the plaintiffs identified references in discovered documents which, they contended, suggested further documents had not been disclosed. The hearing was adjourned by consent so the defendants could swear another affidavit. The strike-out and further-discovery application remained to be completed when the cross-examination application came before the court.
The plaintiffs argued that repeated errors and omissions in the defendants’ discovery raised doubts about its adequacy. They also sought the names of people whose information to the Ryanair Pilot Group Interim Council had been redacted. The defendants said they had given those people firm confidentiality assurances and that disclosure could deter others from providing information. The plaintiffs said the names could assist in proving malice.
The court found no conflict of fact in the affidavits about the confidentiality assurances. It said the difference concerned the basis on which confidentiality was offered, depending on how people approached the Pilot Group. The court also said that the plaintiffs’ disbelief of the deponents did not justify cross-examination in the circumstances.
Cross-examination on an affidavit of discovery was described as a very rare remedy, to be allowed only when necessary and when other available procedures had proved inadequate. The court said that had not been established: the part-heard application could still result in further and better discovery if the existing discovery proved inadequate. The number of discovery affidavits sworn, by itself, did not show that the process was flawed.
The court therefore declined both to grant leave for the notices already served and to order the deponents’ attendance. It did not determine the underlying defamation claims or the outstanding strike-out and further-discovery application.