The High Court refused all relief sought by Roderick Jones in a judicial review challenging the Minister for Justice and Equality’s decision that he was ineligible for naturalisation. The court found that the Minister reached the correct conclusion by a legally impermissible route: the citizenship legislation did not allow a discretionary absence period for the required year of continuous residence.
Mr Jones, an Australian national, applied to become an Irish citizen. The relevant period ran from 1 September 2016 to 31 August 2017. He was outside Ireland for 100 days during that year: 97 days on holiday and three days for work. In a decision letter dated 11 October 2018, the Minister found him ineligible because his absences exceeded the six-week allowance, with possible additional time in exceptional or unavoidable circumstances, which the Minister had applied.
In a judgment delivered on 11 July 2019, Mr Justice Max Barrett held that section 15(1)(c) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 did not give the Minister discretion to make that allowance. The question was whether the applicant had in fact completed one year’s continuous residence, the judge said. Applying the ordinary meaning of “continuous” as unbroken and uninterrupted, the court concluded that the 100 days abroad interrupted Mr Jones’s residence during the relevant year.
The court rejected the applicant’s arguments that the Minister had applied the law too literally and that the absence policy was unlawful. It also rejected the claim that the Minister’s finding was materially wrong or irrational, while holding that the method used to reach it rested on legal error.
The judge accepted that a person may remain ordinarily resident in Ireland while travelling abroad. But, in the court’s view, residence interrupted by trips outside the State could not amount to “continuous residence” for the statutory one-year period. The court said a literal reading did not produce an absurdity requiring a different interpretation.
Despite identifying the legal error, the court declined to grant relief or remit the matter. The basic facts were undisputed, and the court’s interpretation would have to be applied on remittal; on those facts, the application had to fail by law. The court said any perceived unfairness in the statutory requirement was for the legislature to address.