The Court of Appeal has ruled that the High Court may set a further surrender date under section 16(5)(a) of the European Arrest Warrant Act after an earlier rescheduled attempt fails. It allowed the Minister for Justice and Equality’s appeals against orders that had refused to hear a second application concerning Tomas Vilkas.
The case arose from two European arrest warrants issued by Lithuania. The High Court ordered Mr Vilkas’s surrender on 9 July 2015. After the orders took effect, a first attempt to surrender him by commercial flight on 31 July failed: he refused to board and became agitated and aggressive, and the pilot would not carry him. The High Court then agreed a new date of 6 August. A further attempt on 13 August also failed, and the Minister sought another date, proposing 15 September after agreeing with the Lithuanian authorities to transport him by ferry and land.
On 14 August, the High Court refused that application and discharged Mr Vilkas. It held that it lacked jurisdiction because a previous order under section 16(5)(a) was already in force. The Minister appealed. The central dispute was whether the statutory scheme allowed only one extended surrender date, or whether the High Court could consider another application.
The Court of Appeal first referred questions about the EU Framework Decision on European arrest warrants to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The CJEU ruled that a new date may be agreed more than once when repeated resistance prevents surrender, provided exceptional circumstances made that resistance unforeseeable and its consequences could not have been avoided despite due care. Whether those conditions are met is for the relevant judicial authority to ascertain.
The Court of Appeal found an ambiguity in the Irish statute and concluded that it could be interpreted consistently with the CJEU’s ruling. It held that the time for surrender under section 16(3A) is subject to sections 16(5) and 16(6), and that a new date under section 16(5)(a) creates a new surrender period. A case may therefore return to the High Court within the applicable period for consideration of a further date.
The court allowed the appeals. It did not itself decide whether the circumstances behind the second application met the required standard for another date; that question had not been heard by the High Court, which had declined jurisdiction. The ruling concerns the High Court’s power to consider such an application, subject to the statutory requirements and judicial oversight.