The Supreme Court dismissed Mark Cronin’s appeal against the refusal of the Court of Criminal Appeal to grant leave to appeal his murder conviction. The court answered “in the negative” the certified question of whether the trial judge had been obliged to give the jury more specific directions about the possibility that the gun went off accidentally or by mistake.
The prosecution case at trial was that Cronin fired a gun in a Limerick nightclub intending to kill or seriously injure his wife, but that the gun was pushed away and another woman was killed. The judgment says the defence at trial was that Cronin had never had or fired a gun. Neither the defence evidence nor counsel’s submissions raised accidental discharge as an alternative defence.
On appeal, Cronin argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider whether an accidental discharge could mean he was not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. The Supreme Court said a judge must ensure a fair trial and identify relevant issues, while giving “heavy regard” to how the defence is run. It concluded that the trial judge had properly balanced those duties by explaining the distinction between murder and manslaughter without speculating about an alternative defence that had not been raised. It dismissed the appeal on this ground.
The court also rejected a challenge to the jury direction on competing inferences. The trial judge had told jurors to choose the inference favourable to the accused where two inferences were equal. The Supreme Court said the direction ideally should have followed the formulation in an earlier Irish case, under which jurors should adopt a view favourable to the accused unless the State had established the other beyond reasonable doubt. But the defence had requested the direction the judge gave, and the court dismissed the ground.
The court rejected an identification-related ground, finding that the central issue was whether the jury had a reasonable doubt about who fired the gun, rather than an identification issue requiring the particular warnings sought. It also said a challenge concerning the trial judge’s remarks on the statutory presumption of intent did not affect the appeal. The judge’s words were unclear, possibly because of transcription, and no requisition had been made about them.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The judgment was delivered by Mr Justice Geoghegan on 3 March 2006.