Judgment: 2012-12-17 · Court archive

High Court rejects damages claim over delay in murder prosecution, awards one-third of costs

The court found that the reasonable-time period began when Mark Nash was charged in October 2009. It had previously refused to stop the trial and made no finding that his rights had been breached.

High Court · [2012] IEHC 598

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • Mark Nash (Applicant)
  • Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)
What

The court found that the reasonable-time period began when Mark Nash was charged in October 2009. It had previously refused to stop the trial and made no finding that his rights had been breached.

Where

No place detail is included in this summary.

When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court rejected Mark Nash’s claim for damages over delay in a murder prosecution but awarded him one-third of his costs, citing the public importance of the case and delay in using forensic technology that was available earlier.

The High Court rejected Mark Nash’s claim for damages over delay in a murder prosecution but awarded him one-third of his costs, citing the public importance of the case and delay in using forensic technology that was available earlier.

The judgment, delivered by Mr Justice Moriarty on 17 December 2012, concerned ancillary relief after the court had refused Nash’s main request for an injunction stopping the prosecution. That earlier decision, given on 10 August 2012, allowed the trial to proceed. The court then heard submissions on damages and costs on 4 October.

Nash argued that the delay breached his constitutional right to trial with due expedition and his rights under Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He sought damages, citing anxiety, difficulty presenting his defence and prolonged imprisonment. He also sought costs even if his damages claim failed.

The Director of Public Prosecutions opposed the claim. The DPP argued that the earlier judgment had made no finding of a rights breach, that the criminal proceedings should be timed from Nash’s charge, and that the claimed effects had not been properly pleaded or supported by evidence.

Justice Moriarty said the earlier judgment had acknowledged substantial delay but had not found it sufficiently unreasonable or unexplained to justify stopping the trial. He concluded that the question of whether damages could be available for a breach did not need to be decided because no such breach had been found in this case.

The judge held that the reasonable-time period began when Nash was charged in October 2009. Crucial evidence had surfaced that month, and Nash was charged a week later; the case then progressed with sufficient speed, he said. The damages claim therefore had no basis. The court did not make a general ruling on whether damages might be available in another case.

On costs, the judge found that forensic technology used in reviewing the evidence had been available some years before the review, and described the failure to act sooner as “at best regrettable”. He said the delay did not justify prohibiting the trial or awarding damages, but could be taken into account on costs. Given the public importance of the case, the forensic delay and the need for suitably experienced defence lawyers in serious cases, he ordered that Nash receive one-third of his costs.

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