The Supreme Court allowed an appeal in proceedings over fire-safety deficiencies at Priory Hall, but Justice Peter Murray said the court did not need to decide whether the Fire Services Act 1981 permits orders requiring work beyond restricting or prohibiting the use of property.
In a judgment delivered on 31 July 2012, Mr Justice Murray agreed with the outcome for the reasons given in judgments by the Chief Justice and Mr Justice Fennelly. His additional observations considered the scope of section 23 of the Act.
Dublin City Council brought the High Court application in its capacity as a fire authority. Section 23 allows a fire authority, where it considers the risk to people in the event of fire to be sufficiently serious, to seek an order restricting or immediately prohibiting use of land or a building until specified measures reduce the risk to a reasonable level. Murray said the council’s original application sought an order of that kind.
He observed that such an order directly affects those using the property, who may not own it. Owners may be affected indirectly. The section appeared to envisage restriction or prohibition of use as the sanction, and Murray said it was unclear whether the High Court could require an owner or user to do more than that.
The appeal issues had essentially concerned High Court orders relating to specified works that one appellant had undertaken to carry out. Murray noted that the appellant owned some apartments and had an interest in Priory Hall’s buildings and common areas, but had no legal interest in most of the apartments. He had nevertheless given undertakings to the High Court in the circumstances described in the other judgments.
Murray said section 23 proceedings appeared to offer limited remedies to owners or users who were not responsible for the fire-safety deficiencies. The case concerned 187 apartments and a small number of retail outlets, and residents had suffered damage and distress after buying properties in good faith, he said. He suggested that enforcing fire-safety standards against builders or developers before properties were sold or transferred could protect such people more effectively.
The judgment did not make a definitive ruling on the wider interpretation of section 23. The available text records that the appeal was allowed, but does not set out the precise final order or the other judgments’ reasons.