Judgment: 2006-03-21 · Court archive

High Court bars further prosecution after finding “inordinate and inexcusable” delay

The court found that delays in correcting a defective trial order infringed the accused’s right to a speedy trial. It prohibited further steps in the criminal proceedings, despite no claim of specific trial prejudice.

High Court · [2006] IEHC 83

Who, what, where, when and why

Who
  • John Devoy (Applicant)
What

The court found that delays in correcting a defective trial order infringed the accused’s right to a speedy trial. It prohibited further steps in the criminal proceedings, despite no claim of specific trial prejudice.

Where

Places mentioned in the report

  • Ballymun
  • Dublin
When

Judgment:

Why

Reasons reported in the judgment

The High Court prohibited further steps in criminal proceedings against John Devoy after finding that prosecution delays were “inordinate and inexcusable” and had infringed his right to a speedy trial. The ruling did not determine whether he was guilty of the charges.

The High Court prohibited further steps in criminal proceedings against John Devoy after finding that prosecution delays were “inordinate and inexcusable” and had infringed his right to a speedy trial. The ruling did not determine whether he was guilty of the charges.

Devoy had been returned for trial in Dublin on four charges arising from an alleged incident at a Ballymun address on 17 October 2001: criminal damage to a sitting-room window, discharging a firearm recklessly, and possessing a shotgun and shotgun cartridges without a lawful purpose. These were allegations, not findings of guilt.

The charges were first struck out in September 2002 because the prosecution had not served a book of evidence. They were re-entered in June 2003, and Devoy was sent forward for trial. A trial date was set for March 2004, but shortly before it, the prosecution said the order returning him for trial was defective and the trial could not proceed.

The High Court quashed that order in November 2004. A fresh order returning Devoy for trial was made in March 2005, and the Circuit Court set a new trial date for February 2006. Devoy sought prohibition, arguing that the prosecution’s delays had denied him a trial with reasonable expedition.

The judge accepted that there was justification for the time taken to prepare the book of evidence, while expressing reservations about the explanation given. But he found no reasonable excuse for the later delays: almost eight months to identify the defect in the trial order, five and a half months to apply to have it quashed, and two and a half months to return the matter to the District Court afterwards. The judge said the defect was apparent on the face of the order and had not been noticed despite the case being mentioned in court three times.

Devoy did not claim that the delay had caused specific prejudice to his defence or made a fair trial impossible. The court nevertheless weighed the community’s interest in prosecution against his right to an expeditious trial. It concluded that the authorities’ handling of the case justified intervention and ordered that the prosecution take no further steps in the criminal proceedings covered by the application.

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