The Court of Appeal has ruled that the impact of a driving ban on a person’s livelihood can, in exceptional circumstances, form part of the reasons for avoiding disqualification after a first conviction for driving without insurance.
The ruling arose from the case of Tony Skillington, who was convicted in the District Court after admitting that he drove a company van without insurance. He was disqualified for two years.
Skillington appealed against the penalty to Cork Circuit Court. He argued that losing his licence would seriously affect his roofing business, Skillman Asphalt Limited, which employed five other people and operated across Munster.
The agreed facts showed that Skillington was the company’s owner and managing director and needed to drive between sites to price contracts and supervise work. He had a wife and three young children and was the main contributor towards the family mortgage.
However, he also accepted that he knew the van was uninsured when he drove it to Cobh to price a roofing job.
The Circuit Court referred a legal question to the Court of Appeal: whether a judge has discretion not to impose a driving ban where disqualification would impair the offender’s or another person’s livelihood.
The relevant legislation allows a court, for a first offence, to avoid or shorten disqualification where a “special reason” is proved.
The Court of Appeal declined to adopt the stricter approach found in some British authorities, under which special reasons generally had to relate directly to the circumstances of the offence rather than the offender.
It held that livelihood consequences could form part of the assessment, particularly when combined with unusual circumstances surrounding the offence. But employment difficulties on their own would rarely, if ever, qualify.
The court answered the legal question “yes”. It added that Skillington’s own case appeared to be a bad example of uninsured driving because his decision to drive was conscious and deliberate. Whether the statutory discretion should actually be exercised remained a matter for the lower court.