The High Court ruled that it could perform its statutory functions in relation to two European Arrest Warrants issued in the UK for Noor (also known as Nur) Khan. It found no need to choose between the warrants because the authorities had indicated he could be surrendered on both.
In a judgment delivered by Ms Justice Donnelly on 1 February 2016, the court rejected Khan’s argument that the law required it to select only one warrant. The warrants seek his surrender for prosecution: one, issued in Northern Ireland, concerns five alleged fraud offences; the other, issued in Leeds, concerns two alleged conspiracy-to-defraud offences. The allegations have not been determined in this judgment.
Khan had objected to surrender on the Northern Ireland warrant, citing his family circumstances and alleging that he had experienced harassment and threats in Maghaberry prison related to his race or ethnic origin. He said he feared for his health and safety if returned there. The court found that the threshold for further inquiry into alleged inhuman or degrading treatment and discrimination had not been met. It said there were no substantial grounds to believe his constitutional or European Convention rights were at risk, and found no substance to his family-rights and discrimination objections.
The court said section 29 of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 allows it to perform its functions in relation to all warrants where appropriate. It interpreted “which of those” warrants as allowing a selection of one or more, including all, rather than requiring the court to choose only one. The court also said it must perform its functions on at least one warrant, and that valid warrants should be dealt with unless surrender is prohibited by the Act.
The judgment ordered Khan’s delivery to a person authorised by the issuing state under section 16 in relation to the Northern Ireland warrant. It found no basis to prohibit surrender on that warrant. For Leeds, the court said it saw no apparent basis to prohibit surrender, but Khan had not yet given formal written consent. It deferred a final determination on that warrant until it heard from him on consent. The judgment therefore did not make a final surrender order on the Leeds warrant.